While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s recent class action decision in Trauernicht v. Genworth Financial Inc., No. 24-1880, – F.4th –, 2026 WL 667917 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 2026), involves an ERISA retirement plan, the decision is useful well beyond that context. The decision highlights that: (1) mandatory (no opt-out) classes are improper for individualized monetary claims; and (2) the commonality requirement is not satisfied by broad labels or generalized theories, particularly where the proposed class includes people who were not harmed.
In Trauernicht, two former employees sued Genworth Financial as sponsor of a defined contribution retirement plan, commonly called a 401(k) plan. The plaintiffs alleged fiduciary breaches in selecting and retaining BlackRock LifePath Index Funds as part of the plan, claiming they were imprudent investment options. The district court certified a mandatory class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) comprised of plan participants and beneficiaries whose accounts were invested in the BlackRock funds during the class period. The district court focused on the nature of the claim under section 502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), concluding that, because the claim was “derivative” on behalf of the plan and recovery would go to the plan as a whole, the claim inherently presented common issues.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that (1) the damages claims were “individualized monetary claims” and therefore could not be forced into a mandatory Rule 23(b)(1) class, particularly given the lack of opt-out and notice requirements, and (2) the district court erred in treating ERISA fiduciary-duty claims as “inherently” satisfying commonality.
Takeaway 1: If it’s really about money, mandatory classes cannot be certified
Rule 23(b)(1) classes are “mandatory”: class members generally have no opt-out right, and the rule does not require notice, which is required for a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3). The Fourth Circuit focused on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) that “individualized monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3),” precisely because (b)(3) includes required procedural safeguards of notice and opt-out rights. The court also emphasized the constitutional due process problem when absent class members’ monetary rights are resolved without notice and opt-out.
Takeaway 2: “Representative” labels don’t eliminate individualized injury and remedy questions
ERISA allows a plan participant to sue derivatively on behalf of the plan for a breach of fiduciary that causes losses to the plan. The district court relied heavily on the “derivative” nature of these claims to justify mandatory certification, reasoning that damages “flow to the class in bulk” rather than to individuals.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, focusing on remedy mechanics in a defined contribution plan: plan assets are allocated to individual accounts, and recovery for a fiduciary breach that impaired a participant’s account would be allocated to the participant’s account based on that account’s losses. That makes the claim functionally an individualized monetary claim in this context. The court distinguished defined contribution plans from defined benefit plans in this respect.
Outside ERISA, the same type of issue can also be decisive. Under this decision, courts need to look past how the cause of action is labeled and consider what has to be proven and how relief would actually be calculated and distributed. If liability or damages turn on individualized circumstances (such as timing, reliance, exposure, mitigation, and offsets), mandatory aggregation becomes much harder to justify.
Takeaway 3: Overinclusive classes with uninjured members are an important certification vulnerability
Genworth Financial argued that many class members suffered no injury. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion suggests that as much as 42% of class members may have fared better in the challenged funds than in other passively managed comparator funds, although this would depend on when they bought and sold particular funds. The Fourth Circuit cited authority recognizing that overinclusive classes can fail commonality because those members do not share the “same injury.”
The district court postponed deciding the parties’ dispute about the appropriate comparator funds “at this juncture,” relying instead on its view that ERISA § 502(a)(2) claims are inherently common in nature. The Fourth Circuit found that to be error, concluding that the district court must do the rigorous commonality analysis and resolve the dispute at certification.
These points matter far beyond retirement plans. Defendants often need to focus on:
- whether the class definition sweeps in uninjured people;
- whether the plaintiffs’ theory has a reliable classwide method to separate injured from uninjured class members without mini-trials; and
- whether injury is truly “the same,” not just a shared allegation that a statute was violated.
Bottom line
Trauernicht is a reminder that class certification requires a rigorous, case-specific showing—and cannot be assumed based on the type of claim. Defendants are likely to rely on this case for (1) why mandatory classes cannot be certified for individualized money claims, (2) why commonality cannot be presumed based on the cause of action alleged or how it is pled, (3) why uninjured class members matter, and (4) why courts must confront key disputes at the certification stage rather than deferring them.